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1. Introduction 
It is now stylised that institutions have significant impact on economic performance. 
North (1991) argues that institutions – formal and informal – are created to reduce 
uncertainty about exchanges; property right is a textbook example (Demsetz, 1967; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). As such, institutions can refer to both the governance 
structures that define the rules of the game and to the rules of the game themselves 
(Coase, 1937; Shubik, 1975; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Efficient institutions clearly 
define the boundaries within which economic agents can act, thereby enabling 
transactions at low cost. The logical outcome of efficient institutions, therefore, is 
better economic performance.  
 Over the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of papers that have 
examined various aspects of the relationship between institutional quality and 
economic performance. Researchers have demonstrated that governance 
characteristics that define the rules of the game have an impact on economy-wide 
development performance (Campos and Nugent, 1999), such that institutional quality, 
as opposed to factors such as geography and trade, is arguably the key determinant of 
economic growth (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004). In particular, researchers 
have argued that the nature of property rights (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2005), legal institutions (Levine, 1998), and labour market institutions 
(Nickell and Layard, 1999; Besley and Burgess, 2004) affect a country’s (or region’s) 
economic growth, investment and production efficiency.  
 However, the debate about the nature of institutions that improve economic 
performance is far from being over. For example, there is as yet no consensus about 
whether democracy or autocracy is better at generating economic growth. While 
property rights can be credibly guaranteed in a democracy (Olson, 1991), with the 
3 
 
attendant (positive) impact on economic growth, lobbying by groups with different 
interests, that is an integral part of a democracy, results in inefficient use of resources 
(Becker, 1983). To complicate matters further, it has been argued that political 
institutions may not influence economic growth significantly after all; growth instead 
is an outcome of economic policies pursued by government (Glaeser et al., 2004). 
Similarly, it has alternately been argued that corruption can be both transaction 
facilitating and therefore growth enhancing (Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985), and 
transaction inhibiting and hence growth reducing (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
1
 
 More importantly, the focus of the literature has largely been macro 
performance of economies, as manifested in economic growth and its correlates like 
investment. Other than in the literature on corporate governance,
2
 the impact of 
institutions on firm performance is largely ignored. The little evidence that is 
available is inconclusive. Using firm-level data on mostly Asian developing 
economies, Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Mengiste (2005) find that cross-country 
differences do affect firm performance, even after controlling for country fixed 
effects. By contrast, Commander and Svejnar (2011) find that the impact of 
institutional quality (or “business environment”) on firm performance is limited in the 
post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  
In this paper, we contribute to this nascent literature by examining the 
institutional quality-firm performance relationship, using a unique cross-country 
                                                 
1
 The literature on the impact of corruption on economic performance highlights the difficulties of such 
empirical exercises which require accurate measurement of “corruption”, for example. To begin with, 
one has to address questions such as to whether corruption is largely a public sector phenomenon that is 
broadly synonymous with bureaucratic rent seeking, and whether corrupt activities are necessarily 
illegal (Bardhan, 1997). One may also have to distinguish between grand and petty corruption whose 
impact on economic activities may differ considerably (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). However, thorough 
reviews of the empirical literature on corruption and growth indicate that the choice of corruption 
indexes does not affect the results significantly (Campos, Dimova and Saleh, 2011). 
2
 In the corporate governance literature, researchers have argued, for example, that a weak legal system 
and, correspondingly, weak enforceability of contracts lead to creation of family firms and 
concentration of equity in the hands of these families and this, in turn, has implications for the quality 
of corporate governance and firm performance.  
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micro data set to examine the impact of “formal” institutions on firm level efficiency.3 
We choose efficiency (with which inputs are converted into output) as our measure of 
firm performance because it is consistent with a key developmental concern, namely, 
the generation of economic growth using limited resources. We focus on firms in the 
textile industry in nine developing countries, textile being an industry in which 
developing countries have comparative advantage and a strong presence in the global 
market.
4
 Further, as we shall discuss later, we concentrate on institutions such as 
economic freedom that define the rules of the game and thereby influence the ease 
with which transactions can take place in product and factor markets. 
Our results indicate that institutions do indeed influence firm-level efficiency, 
after controlling for factors such as size and ownership, but not in the way that is 
suggested by conventional wisdom. Labour market institutions that provide greater 
social security benefits and employment rights reduce inefficiency in production. 
Better business environments increase such inefficiencies. Our results suggest that 
there is greater scope for research on the relationship between institutional quality and 
firm performance; the debate about this relationship is far from being over. While 
restrictive or low quality institutions may adversely affect outcomes such as firm 
entry rates, they might be beneficial for productive efficiencies of incumbent firms, 
such that blanket classification of institutions as “good” or “bad” might be too 
simplistic.  
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss some 
areas of divergence between macro- and micro- impacts of institutional quality. The 
                                                 
3
 We consider an institution to be “formal” when it is legally encoded and enforced.  
4
 In the middle of the decade, even before the end of the quotas embedded in the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement, developing countries accounted for half the world’s textile exports and three-quarters of 
the clothing exports (UNCTAD, 2005).   
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empirical strategy is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the data and 
specification. The results are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Impact of institutional quality: The macro-micro divide 
Since estimates of private benefits and costs resulting from the existence of formal 
institutions are likely to differ from social benefits and cost, it is not surprising that 
the impact of such institutions may have different impact on the behaviour and 
performance of individual economic agents and on the society or economy as a whole. 
Consider, for example, corruption, which is widely accepted as a manifestation of 
weak institutional quality. For individuals and firms, corruption can add to the money 
cost of doing business (which can be interpreted as rent for scarce resources such as 
licences and permits), and also to the transactions cost of doing business as well, since 
implicit contracts based on bribes etc can always be renegotiated ex post. For the 
society as a whole, however, the impact of corruption is ambiguous and depends on 
the quality of other institutions (Aidt, Dutta and Sena, 2007; Meon and Weill, 2010). 
Further, the society can incur a deadweight loss that, by definition, cannot be assigned 
to individual economic agents. Specifically, if the corrupt practices are illegal as well, 
such that resources have to be used to keep these practices secret, and hence the 
deadweight loss (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). In other words, there is a micro-macro 
divide in the way which corruption affects economic performance and behaviour. 
 This divide is also observed in other contexts. For example, the popular 
wisdom in the labour economics literature that labour market flexibility, with respect 
to both hiring and firing of labourers and also with respect to wages and other 
benefits, is desirable. It has been argued in the literature that labour market rigidities 
adversely affect macroeconomic performance. Eichengreen and Iversen (1999) argue 
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that as there was increase in the diversity of the quality of production, labour market 
rigidities in Europe acted as impediments to growth. Besley and Burgess (2004) 
demonstrate that output, employment, investment and productivity in the formal 
sector was lower in Indian states where the Industrial Disputes Act (which has direct 
implications for the ability of firms to hire and fire employees) was amended in 
favour of workers. 
 The bulk of the discussion about labour market rigidities focus on the impact 
of these rigidities on the (un)employment rate (Saint-Paul, 2004), one implication of 
high unemployment rate being under-utilisation of an important (and, in the case of 
developing countries, perhaps the most important) productive resource. Such rigidities 
may also lead to redistribution of workers from sectors that are more affected by 
labour laws and wage rigidities to those that are less affected by them (Solow, 2000). 
In the context of a developing country, labour market rigidities can increase allocation 
of the work force to the informal sector that is often less productive on account of 
factors such as absence of scale economies and difficulties in access to credit.  
 The literature that discusses the impact of labour market rigidities on macro 
variables such as growth and unemployment rate ignores the impact of these rigidities 
on the behaviour of firms and workers. Storm and Naastepad (2007) argue that curbs 
on hiring and firing can induce firms to invest in training and on-the-job learning, 
whose benefits can more than offset the loss of allocation efficiency. They 
demonstrate that the “rigid” labour market conditions promote long run labour 
productivity growth. Arulampalam and Booth (2002) demonstrate that part time 
employment and short term contracts, which are outcomes of labour market 
flexibility, are associated with significantly less work-related training. Available 
evidence also suggest that incentives such as employment security can improve 
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employee commitment, and are also positively correlated with performance enhancing 
strategies like greater investment in R&D and new technology (Michie and Sheehan, 
1999). 
Indeed, an important implication of flexible labour markets, namely, the 
linkage between the wage rate and prevailing labour market conditions (mainly 
unemployment rate) has repeatedly been brought into question. The divergence 
between market-clearing wage and the wage that minimizes labour cost per efficiency 
unit of labour is well documented in the efficiency wage literature (Kazt, 1986; Table 
1, pp. 251; Campbell III, 1993). Fehr and Falk (1999) have demonstrated that when 
labour contracts are incomplete, workers efforts are correlated to their wage, such that 
it would not be optimal for employers to accept low wage bids by potential workers 
even in weak labour market conditions (with high unemployment rate, for example).  
Similarly, the popular wisdom that social safety nets such as significant and/or 
prolonged unemployment benefits are undesirable because of their adverse 
implications for magnitude and duration of unemployment (Katz and Meyer, 1990) do 
not take into consideration the impact of these measures on productivity of workers 
and x-efficiency.
5
 It is now well understood that ability of workers to remain 
productive depends significantly on factors such as their nutrition status (Dasgupta, 
1993). During spells of unemployment, in the absence of asset-related incomes 
(which is not unusual for a large proportion of labour force participants in developing 
countries), preservation of productivity levels may significantly depend on social 
                                                 
5
 In any event, the popular view about the impact of social safety nets such as unemployment benefits 
is not always borne out by data. For example, Andolfatto and Gomme (1996) demonstrate that a 
significant increase in unemployment benefits in Canada in 1972 did not have a significant impact on 
the unemployment rate, but these measures increased labour market turnover, aside from having the 
expected positive impact on social welfare. 
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security benefits such as unemployment insurance.
6
 These benefits also enable out-of-
work labourers to bear the search cost of finding employment that are consistent with 
their skills, thereby enhancing post-employment x-efficiency. Indeed, Acemoglu and 
Shimer (2000) demonstrate that an increase in unemployment insurance increases 
labour productivity by encouraging labourers to look for high productivity jobs and 
also by encouraging firms to create such jobs. Similarly, Kumar (2002) demonstrates 
that in labour markets where the firm-employer has monopsony power, absence of 
unemployment benefits leads to an inefficiently low level of capital investment, even 
as unemployment rate is low in equilibrium. Output, therefore, is maximised at a 
positive level of unemployment benefits, even when the workers are risk neutral.
7
 
Building on the argument of Agell (1999), it is also possible to argue that 
social safety nets, and the associated phenomenon of wage compression, may also 
facilitate efficiency gains. In the presence of significant wage risk, risk averse workers 
will seek appropriate insurance contracts that private markets will often not 
underwrite, especially in developing countries. If then governments provide insurance 
by way of social safety nets, workers might be willing to accept a lower average 
wage, thereby raising the (dollar) efficiency of the firms that employ these workers. 
The efficiency gains will be even more pronounced if a reduction in wage risk also 
results in greater investment in human capital. 
 Differences in the impact of institutions (and allied policies) that promote 
flexibility of firms and the economy as a whole can be observed in non-labour market 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion of the social investment aspect of labour market policies such as unemployment 
benefits, see Bonoli (2009). 
7
 In a related study, Gordon (1995) argues that there is little evidence to suggest that there is a trade-off 
between unemployment (which is often associated with components of the social safety net such as 
unemployment benefit) and productivity. Gordon finds that the rapid productivity growth in Europe in 
the 1980s, relative to the United States, can be explained by convergence (or catching up), and has little 
to do with persistently high unemployment rates in European countries. The deceleration of 
productivity growth in Europe in the 1990s, on the other hand, is in part an outcome of a slowdown in 
the convergence process, and in part explained by a slower rate of capital accumulation in Europe. 
9 
 
contexts as well. While available evidence is mixed, broadly speaking, it suggests that 
enhancing economic freedom, which generally implies that private economic agents 
operate in environments in which property rights and where market forces are not 
reined in or pre-empted by governments, is positively correlated with economic 
growth (de Haan and Siermann, 1998; Carlsson and Lundstrom, 2002). The positive 
impact of economic freedom on economic growth operates primarily through an 
improvement in allocational efficiency. However, given that foresight is necessarily 
imperfect, firms can make suboptimal decisions about capacity expansion, investment 
in fixed assets etc, which may have adverse implications for their efficiency and 
productivity. Evidence of such over-investment has been found in the Indian 
manufacturing sector during the nineties (Uchikawa, 2001, 2002), coinciding with the 
significant increase in economic freedom on account of the post-1991 reforms, and is 
consistent with the evidence about a substantial decline in average firm-level 
efficiency in the Indian manufacturing sector over during the last decade of the 
twentieth century (Bhaumik and Kumbhakar, 2010). 
 To summarize, there is evidence to suggest that the impact of institutional 
quality on macro- variables such as economic growth and micro- variables such as 
measures of firm-performance may be quite different. Much of the discussion about 
the impact of institutional quality focuses on its macro- impact, and institutions such 
as labour market flexibility are labelled “good” or “bad” based on their impact on 
macro- variables such as unemployment rate. Given the differences between the 
macro- and micro- impacts of institutions, however, there is a need to better 
understand the micro- impacts of institutional quality as well, before any labelling 
exercise, thereby raising the importance of empirical research on the micro- impact of 
institutional quality. This remains the focus of the rest of this paper. 
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3. Empirical strategy: Modelling firm efficiency 
The neo-classical production theory implicitly assumes that all production activities 
take place on the frontier of a feasible production set (subject to random errors). The 
frontier itself is defined as of the maximum possible output that is technically 
attainable for the given inputs (output-oriented measure), or as the observed output 
level that can be produced using least amounts of inputs (input-oriented measure). 
The production efficiency literature, however, relaxes the assumption, and considers 
the possibility that production activities might take place inside the frontier due to 
technical inefficiency. Technical inefficiency can be output-oriented if actual output 
produced is less than the frontier output for a given amount of input (subject to 
random errors). Alternatively, it can be input oriented if the amount of inputs actually 
used is more than the minimum required to produce a given level of output. These are 
two ways of examining inefficiency. Graphically, the inefficient production plans are 
located below the production frontier.  
<INSERT Figure 1 about here> 
In Figure 1, f(x) is the production frontier, and point A is an inefficient 
production point. There are two ways to see why the production plan in A is 
inefficient. The first way is to see that at the current level of input usage (x = ON) 
maximum possible output that can be produced is OA, given the technology. Thus, 
the distance AB shows the amount of output that is lost due to technical inefficiency, 
and it forms the basis from which the output-oriented (OO) technical inefficiency is 
measured. The other way to see why point A is inefficient is to recognize that the 
same level of output can be produced using less inputs, which means that the 
production point can move to the frontier by reducing inputs. Thus, the distance AC 
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measures the amount by which the input can be reduced without reducing output. 
Since this move is associated with reducing inputs, the horizontal distance AC forms 
the basis to measure input-oriented (IO) technical inefficiency. 
Mathematically, we can write the production relationship as 
)( uvXy            (1) 
where X is a vector of factor inputs, v is the iid error term which follows a normal 
distribution with a zero mean and positive variance, and u is the non-negative 
inefficiency term that has a half normal distribution (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). Inefficiency (at the firm-level, for example) itself can then be modelled as  
Zu            (2) 
where Z is a vector of explanatory variables (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The two 
equations are estimated simultaneously using the maximum likelihood method, and 
the resultant estimates are unbiased and efficient.  
 In our paper, we adopt the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach to modelling 
output and efficiency. In keeping with the literature, we model output as a translog 
function of material inputs, labour and capital:  
                             
 
        
        
        
   
                                                                        (3) 
when y is sales, m is cost of materials used for production, l is the cost of labour, k is 
capital stock, u is the half-normally distributed inefficiency term, and v is the iid error 
term.  
We model firm level inefficiency as a function of firm level characteristics 
like size (scale efficiency), ownership
8
 and institutional variables that characterise the 
                                                 
8
 There is a large literature on the impact of ownership on firm performance, in particular on the 
beneficial impact of private and foreign ownership on firm performance (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
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environment in which the firms operate.
9
 The inefficiency equation, therefore, brings 
together firm-level and country-level variables, and is specified as follows: 
                                                          
                                           (4) 
To recapitulate, we are interested in the impact of institutions on firm efficiency, and 
hence the focus of our analysis is the sign and significance of the 3 and 4. We 
discuss the specific measures of variables in the next section. 
 
4. Data 
For the empirical exercise, we bring together data from three different sources. The 
firm-level data on measures of output and input, size and ownership are obtained from 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys which collect data from manufacturing sector 
firms from around the world. The surveys use standardised survey instruments, 
making data from different countries comparable. We pool together cross-section data 
sets from countries that were surveyed between 2002 and 2005. Nominal variables 
used for the estimation of the production function were converted into real US dollars, 
thereby making them comparable across the countries.  
                                                 
9
 Specifications in which firm and country level variables are used simultaneously are fairly common in 
the literature on firm performance in which firm-level variables such as innovation and managerial 
quality are used together with industry-level variables such as import penetration, scale of presence of 
foreign/multinational firms etc (Keller and Yeaple, 2009). Some papers have also pooled together firm-
level variables and measures of regional characteristics such as unemployment rate and legislative 
quality (Bhaumik and Estrin, 2007). It is sometimes argued that estimation of multilevel models require 
the use of the iterative generalized least square technique which is widely used in the health and 
education literature (Goldstein, 1995). An advantage of using a multi-level approach is that it allows 
not only estimation of national-level fixed effects but also random effects, and to determine what 
portion of the total variance in enterprise level performance is due to within country variation in 
enterprise level characteristics, and what proportion is due to differences in the national context. But in 
the economics literature this technique is used sparingly, and it is stylised to use standard cross-section 
or panel data estimation techniques such as difference in difference models (Bhaumik and Estrin, 2007; 
Djankov and Murrell, 2002) and stochastic frontier models (e.g., Adkins and Moomaw, 2003; Beccalli, 
2004).  
13 
 
 The firm level data set also gives us our measure of firm size is a categorical 
variable that ranks firms on a 5-point scale. The categories themselves are based on 
the number of employees. It also gives us our control for ownership. We have 
continuous data for proportion of a firm that is owned by the state, domestic private 
investors and foreign investors. However, with a few exceptions, the largest 
shareholder of each firm – whether the state, domestic private or foreign – owned 
close to 100 percent of the shares. Hence, instead of using the continuous variables, 
we use dummy variables to indicate the type of the controlling owner. Since fewer 
than 2 percent of domestic firms are state owned, it is meaningless to distinguish 
between state-owned and privately-owned firms.
10
 We, therefore, control for foreign 
ownership alone. In our sample, 4.5 percent of the firms are foreign owned. 
 In keeping with our discussion in section 2, we are interested in indexes that 
capture both the flexibility of the economic environment at large and the flexibility of 
institution that affect the recruitment of labourers by the firms and the performance of 
the recruited workers. Note however that even the most widely used indexes to 
capture these two different aspects of the economic and labour market environment 
tend to be highly correlated. Indeed, the correlation matrix reported in Table 1 
indicates that there is a high level of correlation between the widely used Botero et al. 
(2004) measures of labour market institutions and other commonly used measures of 
institutional quality. Given these correlation coefficients, we choose for our 
specification the Botero et al. (2004) measure of “social security” – which captures 
the extent of protection provided to employees against old age, death and disability, 
sickness and healthcare coverage, and unemployment benefits – that has low level of 
                                                 
10
 We nevertheless experimented with a dummy for state ownership in the specification for the 
inefficiency equation. However, the state ownership dummy was insignificant and was dropped form 
the specification. 
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correlation with the other indices of institutional quality. Note that, by construction, 
the extent of social security increases with the value of the index.  
< INSERT Table 1 about here> 
 Finally, as a measure of the quality of the business environment, we use the 
indices of institutional quality provided by the Heritage Foundation (see Johnson, 
Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998; Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2004).
11
 The index 
ranges in value from 0 to 100, with institutional quality or quality of business 
environment increasing in the value of the index. As we shall see later, we experiment 
with three different measures of institutional quality or business environment: Our 
narrow measure of institutional quality is the quality of property rights, whose role as 
an important determinant of firm performance is well documented in the literature 
(Alchian, 1965; de Alessi, 1980). Our intermediate measure of institutional quality is 
the index for business freedom which measures the ease with which firms can enter 
and exit the market, and is therefore related to allocative efficiency. Finally, our wide 
measure of institutional quality is overall economic freedom that encompasses not just 
property rights and business freedom, but also factors such as labour market 
flexibility, openness of the economy to international trade, and the ease with which 
firms can make their own investment decisions. These indices are highly correlated 
with each other, as well as with other measures of institutional quality such as the 
Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International. Therefore, we 
                                                 
11
 All numerical measures of institutional quality are ad hoc to an extent, and are highly correlated. For 
example, Ochel and Rohn (2006) demonstrate that the Spearman rank correlation coefficient of the 
competitiveness indices of the World Economic Forum and the International Institute for Management 
Development, and the indices of economic freedom of the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation 
vary between 0.63 and 0.87. In one of the few studies of its kind, Edwards (1998) demonstrates that the 
estimate of the relationship between openness and total factor productivity is robust to the choice of 
alternative measures of openness, including the measure of trade freedom constructed by the Heritage 
Foundation. Hence, we use the Heritage Foundation indices that are most commonly used in the 
literature. 
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consider these to be alternative composite measures of the ease with which firms can 
make business decisions and the incentives they have to maximise firm performance. 
 Our data are limited in part because of missing information in the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey data, and in part because the Botero et al. (2004) paper does not 
provide measures of labour market institutions for all countries. An outcome of this 
limitation is that for most individual industries we either have relatively small 
samples, or little cross-sectional variation with respect to countries. Since the focus of 
our analysis is the impact of institutional quality on firm performance, and given that 
measures of institutional quality are only available at the country level, our sample 
has to be spread across a fair number of countries. At the same time, it is stylised in 
the literature to estimate production functions separately for individual industries, 
based on the reasonable assumption that the marginal impact of factor inputs on 
output vary across industries, such that we require a reasonably large sample for each 
industry that is analysed. Only one industry – textiles and garments – meet both these 
criteria. It gives us a cross-section of 1625 firms, spread across nine developing 
countries: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Pakistan, South Africa and 
Zambia.  
< INSERT Figure 2 about here> 
 The textiles and garments industry however has characteristics that are quite 
suitable for our analysis. To begin with, it is an industry in which developing 
countries have comparative advantage. Recent estimates suggest that the ratio of the 
share of textiles and garments in exports of individual developing countries to the 
ratio of textiles and garments in world exports is significantly greater than one for 
many developing countries (see Figure 2), indicating that developing countries have a 
comparative advantage in these products (Nordas, 2004). Further, the textiles and 
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garments industry has not witnessed significant technical progress in the recent past, 
certainly not since the turn of the century.
12
 Hence, productivity in the industry is 
driven not so much by technical progress but by efficiency gains, the latter being our 
measure of firm performance in the stochastic frontier paradigm.
13
 
< INSERT Table 2 about here> 
At the same time, the nine countries in our sample are not only very different 
from a macroeconomic perspective but also, as reported in Table 2, they also have 
quite different levels of institutional quality. For example, at one extreme we have a 
country like South Africa with an index of economic freedom that is 67.1, very close 
to the threshold of 70 for “mostly free” countries, and at the other end we have India 
with an index value of 51.2, just above the threshold of 50 below which lie the 
“repressed” countries. Similarly, the index for labour institutions indicate that we 
have, at the one extreme, countries like Zambia (0.32) which do not provide much 
protection to employees and, at the other extreme, countries like China (2.24) and 
Egypt (2.22) that provide a fair degree of protection. 
                                                 
12
 For example, there was no evidence of technological progress in the Chinese textile industry as early 
as 1990-94 (Kong, Marks and Wang, 1999). Even in a technologically advanced economy such as the 
United States, the extent of average annual technical progress for the textiles and apparel industries, for 
the 1993-2001 period, may have been 1.3 percent and 1.6 percent, respectively (Datta and 
Christoffersen, 2005). This evidence does not rule out productivity growth in some developing country 
firms by way of catching up with the international technological frontier, nor productivity growth by 
way of innovation in design etc. However, the former largely takes place through upgrading of capital 
stock rather than through neutral technical progress, and the latter is generally less of an issue in 
developing countries that were, until recently, associated much more with bulk production of textile 
products, often as part of global supply chains, than with cutting edge advances in design and allied 
innovation. 
13
 Note that our choice of methodology would remain appropriate so long as technical efficiency -- 
which, along with technical progress and scale efficiency drives overall productivity growth (Ray and 
Desli, 1997) -- continues to explain a significant proportion of productivity growth. In other words, 
subject to availability of data, our methodological approach can be extended to all mature industries 
where technological progress is sporadic and where gain in technical efficiency is an important driver 
of productivity growth. If, however, productivity growth is almost entirely determined by technological 
progress, it might be more appropriate to regress growth in total factor productivity on firm-level 
characteristics and country- or region-level institutional variables, perhaps within a multilevel 
framework. To the extent that competition and labour quality explain total factor productivity (see 
Bhaumik and Estrin, 2007), our analytical approach which links labour protecting institutions (which 
have implications for labour quality) and economic and business freedom (which has implications for 
competition) with firm performance could still provide interesting insights. 
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Hence, while results based on one industry may not be conclusive, we feel that 
our results, discussed in the next section, provide prima facie evidence that has 
relevance for the debate about the importance of institutional quality, especially for 
developing countries that are routinely exhorted to improve the quality of their 
institutions to improve economic performance. 
 
5. Regression results 
The regression results are reported in Table 3. The specification of the (translog) 
production function is the same across the columns, but there are differences in the 
specification for the inefficiency equation. In column (1), we report the specification 
with the broad measure of institutional quality, namely, index of economic freedom. 
In column (2), we report the specification with the intermediate measure of 
institutional quality, namely, index of business freedom. And in column (3), we report 
the specification with the narrow measure of business environment, namely, index of 
property rights. The statistical significance of the parameter γ indicates that there is 
indeed inefficiency in the production relationship such that ordinary least squares 
(OLS) would not have been the appropriate method to estimate the production 
function.
14
  
<INSERT Figures 3 and 4 here> 
Since the focus of our analysis is the impact of institutional quality on firm-
level inefficiency, we do not discuss the coefficient estimates of the production 
function itself, and proceed to a discussion of the estimates of firm-level inefficiency 
and its determinants. However, we report the distribution of technical efficiency 
across firms and across countries, in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. Figure 3 shows 
                                                 
14
 If the null hypothesis of γ = 0 cannot be rejected, then σu = 0, and the inefficiency term u should then 
be removed from equation (3).  
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that most of the firms are quite close to the frontier; a large majority of them has 
technical efficiency between 0.65 and 0.95. The average technical efficiency is 0.78 
and the median is 0.80. This can be expected in a competitive globalised industry 
where production efficiency might be the key to sustained export capabilities. Figure 
4 indicates that the average firm-level efficiency varies significantly across countries. 
In keeping with expectations, it is much higher in major exporters like China and 
India than in countries like Malawi and Zambia. These results are robust to the choice 
of the measure of business environment in the inefficiency equation. 
<INSERT Table 3 here> 
 The coefficient estimates of the inefficiency equation indicates the following: 
(a) inefficiency decreases with firm size, (b) foreign ownership increases firm level 
inefficiency, (c) labour market institutions that protect employees reduce inefficiency, 
and (d) an improvement in the overall economic freedom or business environment 
increases firm level inefficiency. The qualitative result about the impact of business 
environment on firm-level inefficiency is robust to the choice of the measure of 
business environment. It is easy to explain the estimated impact of firm size on 
inefficiency: economies of scale matters. The performance enhancing (i.e., 
inefficiency reducing) effect of restrictive labour market institutions, and the 
inefficiency enhancing impact of the different measures of economic freedom or 
business environment too are consistent with our discussion earlier in this paper. 
Interestingly, in our results, the extent of the impact of business environment on firm-
level efficiency increases with the broadness of the measure; it is small (0.01) and 
weakly significant (at the 10 percent level) for the index of property rights, and large 
(0.30) and strongly significant (at the 1 percent level) for the index of economic 
freedom. In other words, while things like property rights have a very limited impact 
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on production inefficiency – as one would expect – greater economic freedom that 
both raises prospects of future growth and provide greater access to factor inputs 
might result in greater inefficiency, as experienced by the Indian manufacturing 
sector, on account of over-investment in capacity. 
 Arguably, the most significant result we report is that labour market 
institutions that protect employees reduce inefficiency. This has significant 
implications for the debate about the welfare state. Our result suggests that there was 
considerable truth in the Abramovitz's (1981) argument that "[t]he enlargement of the 
government's economic role, including its support of income minima, health care, 
social insurance, and other elements of the welfare state, was, therefore -- at least up 
to a point -- not just a question of compassionate regard for the unfortunate, and not 
just a question of reducing inequalities of outcome and opportunity .... It was, and is -- 
up to a point -- a part of the productivity growth process itself" (pp. 2-3). It also ties in 
well with the argument that the absence of an European-style welfare state in the 
United States, which is also reflected in differences in labour market institutions 
across the Atlantic, is not explained well by economic factors, and is explained much 
better by the political structure of United States and racial fragmentation in that 
country (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001). Taken together, these results suggest 
that unless there is strong evidence about substantial impact of labour market policies 
that protect employees on unemployment rate and duration of unemployment in a 
given context, it might be difficult to argue against the existence of these institutions 
on economic grounds.  
 One shortcoming of our data set is the small number of observations for 
relatively small countries, especially when we work at the sectoral level. For example, 
in the case of Malawi, there are only 12 observations in textiles and 3 in garments, 
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while in the case of Zambia there are 23 observations for textiles and 0 in garments. 
As a robustness check we therefore drop these samples and re-estimate our 
regressions. As indicated in Table 4, with the exception of the size variable, which 
loses its significance, our results are qualitatively the same. 
     < Insert Table 4 about here> 
 Our results raise questions about the popular wisdom that greater labour 
market flexibility is necessarily good. They also suggest that the implications of 
greater economic freedom have to be carefully thought through. Indeed, our result 
regarding the impact of economic freedom or business environment is stronger than 
that of Commander and Svejnar (2011) who find that cross-country differences in the 
measure of business environment do not have significant impact on firm performance, 
in the transition country context. 
 
6. Conclusion 
It is generally argued that institutional quality is a key factor determining economic 
growth, as well as covariates of growth like market entry by firms and employment 
generation. Institutional quality is also believed to add to firm performance, when 
measured in terms of sales growth, investment growth and profitability. However, 
some recent studies suggest that, while better institutional quality may have beneficial 
macro implications, it may not have positive implications for firm performance. More 
generally, the macro- and micro- impacts of institutional quality may be different, 
such that labelling institutions as “good” or “bad” on the basis of their macro- impact 
may be premature. 
We use cross-country firm-level data from nine developing countries to 
examine this issue. We use production efficiency as our measure of firm performance 
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because in a developing country context efficient use of limited resources has greater 
developmental implications than sales growth or profitability. We find that certain 
restrictive institutions like greater protection of employee rights, which are believed to 
have negative implications for macro variables like employment growth, may actually 
enhance production efficiency. By contrast, better business environment may actually 
be detrimental for production efficiency. Our results suggest that indeed the debate 
about the implications of institutions and the classification of institutions into “good” 
and “bad” is far from being over, and there is need to examine this issue further. 
 To the extent that less flexible labour markets and less economic freedom are 
correlated with the extent of government intervention in the economy through 
appropriate industrial policy, including facilitation of training of the workforce, it is 
feasible that our results reflect the impact of these unobserved industrial policies. 
However, since such government interventions take many forms, it would be very 
difficult to formulate ordinal measures of industrial policy that are comparable across 
countries. An interesting way to extend this research would therefore be to undertake 
country-level case studies or empirical research to examine both the relationship 
between market orientation of institutions and government policy interventions in the 
industrial sector, as well as the interaction between these policies and interventions in 
affecting firm (or micro) performance. 
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Figure 1: Technical efficiency 
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Figure 2: Comparative advantage of the countries in textiles and garments 
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Table 1: Correlation matrix of institutional variables 
           
 
Heritage Foundation 
Transparency 
International 
Botero et al. (2004) 
 Economic 
freedom 
Business 
freedom 
Property 
rights 
Corruption 
perception 
Labour 
flexibility 
Industrial 
relations 
Social 
security 
Economic 
freedom 
1.00       
Business 
freedom 
0.93 1.00      
Property 
rights 
0.51 0.63 1.00     
Corruption 
perception 
0.66 0.78 0.77 1.00    
Labour 
flexibility 
0.68 0.78 0.56 0.63 1.00   
Industrial 
relations 
0.64 0.77 0.78 0.93 0.76 1.00  
Social 
Security 
0.11 0.22 0.34 0.64 0.20 0.69 1.00 
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Table 2: Institutional quality across the countries 
 
Country 
Index of 
Economic 
Freedom 
Index of 
Business 
Freedom 
Index of 
Property 
Rights 
Social 
Security 
Index 
Brazil 63.4 70 50 1.65 
China 52.6 55 30 2.24 
Egypt 55.5 55 50 2.22 
India 51.2 55 50 1.20 
Indonesia 55.8 55 30 0.53 
Malawi 54.7 55 50 0 
Pakistan 55.8 55 30 1.39 
South Africa 67.1 70 50 1.69 
Zambia 59.6 55 50 0.32 
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Figure 3: Distribution of technical efficiency across firms 
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Figure 4: Variation in technical efficiency across countries 
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Table 3: Impact of institutions on efficiency 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Production function (frontier) 
Constant   1.32 *** 
  (0.12) 
  1.35 *** 
  (0.13) 
  1.38 *** 
  (0.12) 
Ln material   0.29 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.29 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.28 *** 
  (0.03) 
½ Ln material sq.   0.07 *** 
  (0.004) 
  0.07 *** 
  (0.004) 
  0.07 *** 
  (0.004) 
Ln labour   0.49 *** 
  (0.04) 
  0.48 *** 
  (0.04) 
  0.45 *** 
  (0.04) 
½ Ln labour sq.   0.06 *** 
  (0.003) 
  0.06 *** 
  (0.003) 
  0.05 *** 
  (0.003) 
Ln capital   0.15 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.16 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.15 *** 
  (0.03) 
½ Ln capital sq. - 0.004 
  (0.003) 
- 0.003 
  (0.004) 
- 0.002 
  (0.003) 
Ln material  Ln labour - 0.14 *** 
  (0.008) 
- 0.13 *** 
  (0.008) 
- 0.13 *** 
  (0.008) 
Ln material  Ln capital   0.006 
  (0.007) 
  0.0007 
  (0.007) 
- 0.002 
  (0.007) 
Ln labour  Ln capital   0.02 *** 
  (0.009) 
  0.02 *** 
  (0.009) 
  0.03 *** 
  (0.009) 
Inefficiency equation 
Constant - 14.13 *** 
  (1.11) 
- 7.20 *** 
  (1.22) 
- 0.68 
  (0.45) 
Size - 0.13 *** 
  (0.05) 
- 0.16 *** 
  (0.06) 
- 0.08 
  (0.06) 
Foreign stake   0.008 *** 
  (0.002) 
  0.008 *** 
  (0.002) 
  0.009 *** 
  (0.002) 
Social security 
legislation 
- 3.76 *** 
  (0.13) 
- 4.35 *** 
  (0.40) 
- 4.79 *** 
  (0.67) 
Index of economic 
freedom 
  0.27 *** 
  (0.01) 
   
Index of business 
freedom 
   0.15 *** 
  (0.02) 
 
Index of property rights   0.01 * 
  (0.008) 
    
Log likelihood - 1622.79 - 1625.16 - 1620.48 
LR 
2
 
(Prob > 
2
) 
  169.30 
  (0.00) 
  164.57 
  (0.00) 
  173.92 
  (0.00) 
   0.77 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.79 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.85 *** 
  (0.01) 
No. of obs.   1625   1625   1625 
Note: The values within parentheses are standard errors. 
  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 4: Robustness check: Countries with small samples excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Production function (frontier) 
Constant   0.88*** 
  (0.09) 
  0.87*** 
  (0.09) 
  0.95*** 
  (0.09) 
Ln material   0.36*** 
  (0.03) 
  0.36*** 
  (0.03) 
  0.38*** 
  (0.03) 
½ Ln material sq.   0.07*** 
  (0.004) 
  0.07*** 
  (0.004) 
  0.08*** 
  (0.004) 
Ln labour   0.62*** 
  (0.04) 
  0.62*** 
  (0.04) 
  0.58*** 
  (0.04) 
½ Ln labour sq.   0.06*** 
  (0.01) 
  0.06*** 
  (0.01) 
  0.07*** 
  (0.01) 
Ln capital   0.21*** 
  (0.03) 
  0.21*** 
  (0.03) 
  0.22*** 
  (0.03) 
½ Ln capital sq. - 0.01 
  (0.004) 
- 0.01 
  (0.004) 
- 0.010 
  (0.003) 
Ln material  Ln labour - 0.16*** 
  (0.01) 
- 0.16*** 
  (0.01) 
- 0.17*** 
  (0.01) 
Ln material  Ln capital - 0.005 
  (0.01) 
- 0.005 
  (0.01) 
- 0.003 
  (0.01) 
Ln labour  Ln capital   0.02* 
  (0.01) 
  0.02* 
  (0.01) 
- 0.02* 
  (0.01) 
 
Constant - 0.95*** 
  (0.04) 
- 0.95*** 
  (0.04) 
- 0.98*** 
  (0.04) 
Size - 0.02 
  (0.10) 
- 0.03  
  (0.11) 
  0.01 
  (0.09) 
Foreign stake   0.01*** 
  (0.003) 
  0.01*** 
  (0.003) 
  0.01*** 
  (0.003) 
Social security 
legislation 
- 3.52*** 
  (0.57) 
- 4.62*** 
  (0.91) 
- 2.81*** 
  (0.40) 
Index of economic 
freedom 
  0.27*** 
  (0.07) 
  
Index of business 
freedom 
   0.23*** 
  (0.07) 
 
Index of property rights     0.08*** 
  (0.02) 
    
Log likelihood - 1586.92 - 1586.90 - 1589.84 
LR 
2
 
(Prob > 
2
) 
  31670.39 
  (0.00) 
  28658.99 
  (0.00) 
  30322.85 
  (0.00) 
    
No. of obs.   1592   1592   1592 
Note: The values within parentheses are standard errors. 
  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
